Can India be a Peacemaker in the Russia–Ukraine War?

The Russia–Ukraine conflict seems to be heading towards its inevitable end. With this potential end in sight, there have been talks about who is best equipped to handle mediating the peace process between the two countries. India has been called upon as a viable option to handle the peacemaking process due to their ongoing relations with all the major parties involved in the conflict. 
India is at a unique juncture in its history. No less can be said of a country with 1.4 billion citizens, the fifth-largest economy and the second-largest startup ecosystem. India is a leader of the Global South and enjoys a great deal of goodwill from other developing nations. Further, it has become a rival to its neighbor China, an aspiring global power. Thus, India is a desirable ally to other foreign powers.
India’s desirability as an ally can be measured in the liberty it claims from all its international partners. The US courts India as a potential ally, but India imports 36% of its oil and defense technology from Russia. Conversely, Indian mortar shells have made their way to the Ukrainian arsenal without substantial indignation from Moscow. India recently rejected a Western call for a collective ban on the Russian media outlet RT with the words “does not pertain [to us].” Simultaneously, it censured RT for “misleading” information about US diplomats in New Delhi.
The liberty on both ends has spilled over to the Russia–Ukraine conflict. Although India denied any formal neutrality, it righteously claimed “the side of peace”. Many nations, including the warring parties, have used this opportunity to call for its participation in the peace process. However, India’s complex web of transactions with the opposing sides hinders this request.
Undeniably, India seems to be the best mediator between the two sides. However, it would not be the first one making an attempt at peace. More than seven different talks have been held under mediation by countries like China, Brazil, Mexico and others, adding more pressure on India to perform well. 
India greatly benefits from dealing with all sides. However, in exchange, it needs to fulfill its partners’ expectations while being under the spotlight. Mediating a peace process in these conditions may not be the best bet.
India has little to gain and a lot more to risk by taking on the role of peacemaker. A ceasefire in the Russia–Ukraine conflict is imminent. However, it does not guarantee a successful peace process. Russia and Ukraine have provisionally achieved their goals on the battlefield. The conflict is now a war of attrition with both sides making unprecedented and unconditional calls for a cessation of fighting. Russians have met their target of capturing the Donbas and other territories up to Crimea. They claim to be capable of ensuring Ukrainian neutrality. Although a ceasefire appears to be imminent, the horizon of peace is far from visible in this conflict. Once a ceasefire is achieved, the status quo will only reduce the motivation to find common ground. Russia is also known for preferring frozen conflicts as an influence expansion method.
The Russia–Ukraine war is a complex conflict with ideological, territorial and secessionist elements. Russia has historically questioned the existence of Ukraine and its border and claimed the territory around the Sea of Azov. Arguably, 27% of people in this region, the Donbas Oblast, also choose secession to it. Self-determination, guarantee of collective security and compromise on territorial integrity will be the basis for any peace plan. It may also include exonerating President Putin and retracting his International Criminal Court warrant for war crimes in Bucha. Most of these issues are often touted as beyond the mandate of interventions by the international community.
India’s likelihood of disappointing either side is high with its limited experience and dependencies on all stakeholders. A position of comparative advantage and the ability to offer inducements is necessary for mediating and enforcing peace. However, India is far too dependent on both sides for their support elsewhere to remain unbiased. It has a $57 billion trade deficit with Russia. This constitutes approximately 36% of its defense technology and cheap crude oil. At the peak of the conflict, Russian oil to India was $12/barrel cheaper than benchmark prices. The discount continues to be nearly $6-7/barrel. The arrows in its quiver of strategic autonomy will be fewer.
Apart from recent financial gains, partnership with Russia is a longstanding neutralizer for India’s issues with China. The benefits predate the recent interest that the West has shown in this problem. India cannot afford to estrange a regional partner in Russia, especially with the Sino-Russian cooperation being at a record high. 
Ironically, all India can expect out of Russia, vis-a-vis China, is for it to not aid Beijing against New Delhi. Active support on this matter can only come from the West. Cooperation with the Western partners, particularly the US, has increased multifold with China’s rising influence in the Indo-Pacific. The US is also India’s largest export destination and a close collaborator in defense production. Approximately $186 billion worth of Indian exports out of $433.09 billion in 2023-24 were destined for the US and Europe. Co-operation from these trading partners helps India derive maximum benefit out of the China Plus One strategy of global manufacturing diversification. 
Most importantly, India needs Russia and the West to prevent being cornered by either on a regular basis. Thus, it would be important and equally tough for it to meet the expectations of special treatment from both ends. India must also not believe that the current leeways from the partners will continue once its actions are seen to be tipping the war in another direction.
Attaching itself to the outcomes of an already failed process could curtail India’s strategic autonomy. Uninhibited exchange with both sides over the past two years has garnered a lot of benefits and goodwill for it. Mediating the peace process will only burden it with the responsibility of being seen as unbiased. This could prevent India from achieving two of its supposedly short-term goals: obtaining a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and settlement of the Kashmir issue. 
Its actions in the course of the peace process could polarize the international community, thereby jeopardizing the more or less universal support for its UNSC permanent membership. As a mediator, India will also be expected to practice in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) what it preaches in Donbas.
Instead, only being seen as the peacemaker could keep its goodwill intact. India can achieve this label and much more, by advocating for humanitarian cooperation at the BRICS summit. 
India presenting itself as a peacemaker is more beneficial for it compared to actually mediating peace. It can do so by diverting efforts towards mitigating the impacts of the conflict. This strategy has worked well in the case of the Israel–Hamas conflict where India has consistently demanded a “humanitarian corridor”. A similar move also reaped goodwill at the G20 Summit that India chaired in 2023. It championed the cause of energy and food security in the Global South and the conflict affected zones. The result was a rare declaration agreeable to the West, Russia and China. 
BRICS appears to be a fitting forum to deploy this strategy. The group has a trans-polar appeal, evident in the interest it has attracted in the past five years. 30 nations have expressed their willingness to join the group. Memberships of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have already begun in January 2024. 
Over the years, BRICS has moved past its identity of being a purely economic union and posited itself as a platform for the Global South. Particularly for those that have been historically excluded from the world’s “G” order. India’s foreign minister S Jaishankar recently said the BRICS exists “because you [the members] would not let us into the G7”. 
A lot can be achieved with 40% of the global population, a quarter of the economy and a numerical majority of developing countries. President Putin has also expressed a similar hope in his statement claiming confidence and close coordination with BRICS partners regarding the war. 
India’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval recently visited Russia for the BRICS NSAs meet. Doval also called-on President Putin along the sidelines of this event. There was much anticipation of a peace plan from the meeting that turned out to be “a briefing on Modi’s Ukraine visit”. Simultaneously, Modi spoke to President Biden “briefing him about his visit to Russia”. India certainly appears to be getting its balancing right. 
For the BRICS summit this week, India must target achieving substantial humanitarian relief through joint efforts by Russia and Ukraine. These could include ensuring free navigation for commercial vessels, developing humanitarian corridors, mitigating environmental impact or safeguarding nuclear infrastructure. 
Safe navigation for commercial vessels and a “bilateral” humanitarian corridor are the lowest hanging fruits on the cooperation tree. Ukrainian grain ships continue to be attacked in transit, while the Russian dark fleet sails heavily under-insured. There already exists a defunct humanitarian corridor agreement between the two parties, put in place with Turkey’s help in 2022. India can advocate for its reinstatement. This will particularly aid global food and energy security and relieve supply chain stress as global shipping freight tariffs are at an all time high. 
The international community has also expressed fear for the safety of nuclear infrastructure in the conflict zone. Missile attacks and power outages in proximity to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant in Ukraine have risked radiation fallout and failure of containment systems. Similar concerns have been raised regarding the war’s ecological impact. For instance, destruction of essential infrastructure such as the Kakhonka hydropower dam has caused heavy flooding and displacement in the areas downstream. India can propose that both parties collectively ensure prevention of such damages and mitigation of their spillovers, a move made easier by the fact that the aforementioned points are part of President Zelenskyy’s ten point peace formula. These measures can also get Russia some international goodwill with minimal strategic bearing.
A breakthrough in impact mitigation could prove to be BRICS’s rite of passage into global security and conflict management. By playing a key role, India will reaffirm that it cares about the developing world and not just its rising influence. Most importantly, it would be doing so in the presence of its regional competitor, China. Success at the summit can open many doors for India to steer BRICS and lead the Global South in the future.
[Kaitlyn Diana edited this piece]
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.